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ABSTRACT
We present Airtnt, a novel scheme that enables users with CPUs
that support Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) and remote
attestation to rent out computing time on secure enclaves to un-
trusted users. Airtnt makes use of the attestation capabilities of
TEEs and smart contracts on distributed ledgers to guarantee the
fair exchange of the payment and the result of an execution. Airtnt
makes use of off-chain payment channels to allow requesters to
pay executing nodes for intermediate “snapshots" of the state of an
execution. Effectively, this step-by-step “compute-payment" cycle
realises untrusted pay-as-you-go micropayments for computation.
Neither the requester nor the executing node can walk away and
incur monetary loss to the other party. This also allows requesters
to continue executions on other executing nodes if the original
executing node becomes unavailable or goes offline.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The cloud computing model developed during the last two decades
and realised by cloud computing providers was built on the premise
of compute centralisation. That is, computing power is geographi-
cally and administratively concentrated in compute infrastructures
of industrial scale, generally called datacenters. The centralisation
of computing comes with several drawbacks. Firstly, in a world
with an increasing number of devices that have low compute and
storage resources, or produce enormous amounts of data [43] at
the edge of the network (e.g., IoT devices, autonomous cars, or
Chromebooks), computation inevitably needs to be outsourced to
external computation nodes. This increased amount of data that
needs to be transferred from the edge of the network towards the
core (to remote servers in order to be processed) is expected to put
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significant strain on ISPs, inter-ISP business relationships and the
Internet backbone. Recent research has thus been focused on find-
ing ways to bring the servers to the edge, so that most information
can stay within the domain boundaries of the edge-ISP rather than
having to traverse the Internet backbone [7, 50].
Secondly, cloud computing services act as large central points
of failure–for example, Amazon Web Services (AWS) controls up
to 40% of the cloud-server market, and when AWS’s Virginia data-
center had an outage, a significant part of the web was offline [54].
These central points of control also make it possible for authorities
to enforce censorship of specific uses of the cloud, canceling any
censorship-resistant property [29].
There is therefore a pressing need to develop alternative, de-
centralised computing infrastructures. To do so, the features of
centralisation need to be re-engineered to fit into a decentralised
and distributed computing domain. For instance, in the centralised
model of cloud computing, the user and the server provider trust
not to defraud each other (i.e., the provider will provide the services
that the user paid for, and the user agrees to provide the payment).
The user also trusts the server provider to not tamper with the task
that the user would like to execute, or its resulting data. The cloud
provider achieves that by building reputation arounds its services,
while disputes (between users and cloud providers) are resolved
through the (physical) court system.
In a decentralised setting, instead, trust and reputation is more
difficult to build as any node can join the system, provide services
and get paid. That said, users do not know who to trust. Building
a reputation system in this case, requires a trusted third party to
enforce a “one review per user" rule to prevent Sybils [24]. An
important research task is therefore, the following: “How can we
design a decentralised computing platform where executing nodes
can execute user’s tasks, and receive payment for it (‘fair exchange’),
without: i) the user and the node trusting each other, ii) a third party
to settle disputes and iii) possibility for either party to defraud each
other (e.g., by lack of payment from the user side or incorrect execution
from the compute provider side”,
Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) [20, 34, 35], have the
potential to address the execution integrity issue, by enabling se-
cure communication between the virtual instance of an application
and an external entity, as well as tamper-proof execution (see sec-
tion 3.3). However by themselves they do not allow for the fair
exchange of payment and result for two mutually distrusting par-
ties.
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Figure 1: Simplified Airtnt overview.
Fair exchange schemes have traditionally required the partici-
pation of a trusted third party [45]. However, trustless distributed
ledgers (‘blockchains’) and smart contracts [15] (see Section 3.1)
can take the role of the mediating third party instead, and facilitate
the fair exchange of the payment and execution result. By augment-
ing TEEs so that results attested by the TEE can be fed to a smart
contract, fair exchange can be facilitated.
One of the key challenges of this approach however, is to over-
come the lack of practicality in sending large results to a smart
contract, which all nodes have to verify. Storing large amounts of
data in a blockchain is associated with high transaction fees [60].
It would therefore be desirable to have to avoid to store the result
at all in the blockchain.
We make the following contributions.
• We design a fair exchange system, called Airtnt, for TEE
computation results and payments, according to which a
malicious user is not able to defraud others and make them
lose money, even if the malicious user is willing to lose
money.
• We design all the required protocols and protocol features
to support execution integrity (i.e., requested computations
should be executed correctly without anyone being able to
tamper with the execution, and the requester should have a
cryptographic proof of the correct execution).
• We design a micropayment system using payment channels
for requesters to pay executing nodes as they execute the
computation. Requesters receive the changes to the state of
the computation after every micropayment and executing
nodes receive the micropayment in order to continue to the
next state of the computation. This way, the computation
can also continue on a different executing node should the
original one go offline.
• We implement and evaluate a prototype to demonstrate the
practicality of our solution. We implement two separate
use-cases, namely, Optical Character Recognition and Game
of Life simulations, each of which demonstrates a separate
feature of Airtnt.
2 SIMPLIFIED SYSTEM OVERVIEW
In Airtnt, we consider that executing nodes receive requests from
requesters to execute predefined functions on some inputs. The
mechanism for requesters and executing nodes to discover each
other is out of the scope of this paper (e.g., it could work as a web-
based service that acts as a marketplace where requesters can bid
for executing nodes to execute their requests).
Upon executing a request, an executing node responds to the re-
quester with the result encryptedwith a newly generated ephemeral
secret key, and the cryptographic hash of the secret key, both gen-
erated and attested by the TEE during the execution of the request.
TEE attestation ensures that the executing node has computed the
correct function and is sending back the correct result. The exe-
cuting node then submits the secret key itself to a smart contract
initialised by the requester. The contract is programmed to send
funds to the executing node upon submission of the preimage of
the hash of the secret key sent to the requester. This allows the user
to decrypt the result, thus achieving the fair exchange of the money
and the execution result without trusting a third party (the third
party is effectively the smart contract, which facilitates the fair
exchange of the payment and execution result, and is untrusted).
Additionally, Airtnt allows for long executions to be ‘paused’
after certain checkpoints in the execution (which we call ‘execu-
tion cycles’), returning the intermediate state of the execution of
the function as the result to the requester. The requester can then
continue the execution by submitting a micropayment through a
special type of Airtnt payment channel, off the blockchain (see sec-
tion 3.2). Micropayments reduce the impact of a requesting node
going offline or becoming dishonest after a long execution and
wasting the requesting node’s resources without payment. It can
be thought of as a way to ‘livestream computation’ with micropay-
ments. The executing node only continues the execution after a
micropayment has been received.
The payment channel is closed at the end of the execution, or if
there is a dispute. If the executing node goes offline at any point
during the execution, the requester can continue the execution with
a different executing node using the intermediate state.
3 BACKGROUND
We present background on smart contracts, payment channels and
trusted execution environments.
3.1 Smart Contracts on Blockchains
The concept of a blockchain was first proposed in Bitcoin [42], as
a decentralised append-only ledger of financial transactions. The
Bitcoin blockchain provides a global ordering on the transactions,
in order to prevent funds being spent twice (the ‘double-spend’
attack). As by now there is extensive literature on this topic, we
only mention the properties of blockchains that Airtnt relies on.
Bitcoin transactions have a simple internal scripting language
that allow the transaction creator to define, as a script, the recipient
of the transaction, such that in order for the recipient to spend the
funds in the transaction, they must provide an input that causes
the script to return true . The most common Bitcoin script defines
a hash of the public key for the recipient, and returns true upon
an input that provides a valid signature associated with that public
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key. The hash of the public key is referred to as an ‘address’, as
senders can use it to send funds to the owner of the key.
Blockchain platforms such as Ethereum [15] have extended Bit-
coin’s script language to allow users to execute more complex
programs on the blockchain, called ‘smart contracts’. These are
interfaces that users can send funds to, such that the management
of those funds are defined by the code of the smart contract. Smart
contracts in Ethereum can be written in high-level languages (i.e.,
Solidity, a JavaScript-like language for Ethereum smart contracts),
and are compiled down to Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) as-
sembly code. This is then published on the blockchain to create
instances of smart contracts, which have their own addresses. Like
classes in object oriented programming languages, instances of
smart contracts have methods that can be called.
Executing a transaction calling a method in an Ethereum smart
contract has a ‘gas’ cost associated with it; the more assembly
opcodes and storage the transaction has, the higher the gas cost.
The price of gas varies depending on the load on the network, and
is paid for using Ether–Ethereum’s built-in currency.
Blockchain platforms such as Bitcoin and Ethereum use proof-of-
work as a consensus mechanism to agree on the ordering of blocks
(which contain batches of transactions that update the state of the
ledger), where nodes called miners create new blocks by repeatedly
hashing the block until it is below a target value, which is adjusted
by the network such that a block is generated every 10 minutes in
the case of Bitcoin, or 30 seconds in the case of Ethereum. In the
case of a fork, the chain with the most accumulated proof-of-work
is considered the correct chain. The security model for proof-of-
work blockchains is that in order for a party to undo a transaction,
they must create a fork of the chain with more accumulated proof-
of-work that the chain that has the transaction in it. In order to do
so, they need to be able to expend more mining power than the
rest of the network (the ‘51% attack’), thus making such attacks
economically unpractical.
3.2 Payment Channels
The fact that all nodes must verify every transaction in public
blockchains, such as Bitcoin or Ethereum, raises scalability issues
and limits their usability in practice [14]. Especially for systems such
as Airtnt, where micropayments are needed, the total transaction
fees would become prohibitive.
As a result, research in this area has shifted to off-chain pay-
ments [2] using payment channels [3]. This allows two parties to
make payments to each other without recording all of their trans-
actions on the blockchain. This typically works by requiring both
parties to create an initial transaction on the blockchain and open
the channel by depositing a certain amount of coins. For as long as
the channel is open, the two parties can make unlimited payments
directly to each other without touching the blockchain, effectively
updating each other’s balance locally. The channel can then be
closed by either party, settling the balance on the blockchain with
a final transaction. This can be thought of as a similar process to
opening a tab at a bar.
There are many technical proposals for designing payment chan-
nel systems on top of the Bitcoin blockchain [3]. These proposals
are designed so that neither of the two parties can steal funds from
each other, or need to trust each other. In Airtnt we focus on unidi-
rectional payment channels using Ethereum, as they are simple to
implement as a smart contract, without changes to the protocol.
Unidirectional payment channels only allow one party (the sender)
to make payments to the other party (the recipient). In order to close
a channel and settle a balance, both parties must sign a message
with the owed amount to the recipient and submit it to the smart
contract, which will then send the owed coins to the recipient. The
typical workflow of a unidirectional payment channel involves the
sender sending a signed message to the recipient increasing the
owed amount of coins. The channel is updated and the recipient
performs the agreed service. Finally, the recipient closes the chan-
nel by signing the last update to the channel, and sending the two
signatures to the smart contract, releasing the deposited funds.
To prevent the need for a user to have to open a payment chan-
nel and maintain a deposit with everyone that they would like to
interact with, it is possible to create multi-hop payment channels.
This allows a payment to travel across multiple users, updating the
balances of multiple payment channels. The Lightning network [1]
is one example of this for Bitcoin, and the Raiden network [5] is an
example for Ethereum.
3.3 Trusted Execution Environments
Traditionally, one protects the integrity and confidentiality of ap-
plications by enforcing the isolation of applications. An operating
system can isolate applications using hardware mechanisms like
virtual address spaces and privileged instructions. Multiple oper-
ating systems running on the same physical host are isolated by
the hypervisor using hardware virtualisation extensions provided
by the CPU. However, Airtnt assumes that functions are executed
on untrusted nodes and that both the hypervisor and the OS can
be compromised. At the same time, in Airtnt, a running virtual
machine requires a private key or a password to decrypt incoming
data. The secret must remain confidential and protected against
access from the hosting node.
Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) is an environment where
code being executed inside the TEE is trusted in authenticity and
integrity and both the code and other assets are protected from
external access. Multiple TEEs are currently being developed for
mobile devices [27] and the most popular CPU architectures [20, 59]
Intel Secure Guard Extension. Intel SGX [20, 34, 35] is an example
of Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) that allows applications or
part of applications’ code to be executed in a secure container, called
enclave, protecting the integrity and confidentiality of code and
data using hardware mechanisms directly in the CPU. SGX enclaves
are protected from other applications, privileged system software,
such as the operating system (OS), hypervisor, and BIOS, as well as
attackers having physical access to the machine. SGX implements
hardware encryption in the CPU so that only the authorised enclave
can access its region of memory. To enable an application to use
enclaves, the developer must provide a signed shared library that
will be executed inside an enclave. The library itself is not encrypted
and can be inspected before being started, hence no secret should
be stored inside the code. The enclave code cannot directly access
OS functions (e.g., networking, I/O); it must invoke these functions
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through special entry-points that are under strict control of the
enclave application.
Remote Attestation. SGX also provides a remote attestation pro-
tocol. Using remote attestation an enclave can obtain a statement
from the CPU attesting that it is running a particular enclave code
with a given memory footprint. A requester can use this attestation
to verify the identity and integrity of a target enclave running on a
remote host, be convinced that the attestation has been generated
by a legitimate SGX CPU, and securely transfer confidential data us-
ing an encrypted connection [31]. Intel SGX provides each enclave
with a seal key that can be used to store data on permanent storage
and access it again upon subsequent execution. This facilitates the
development of applications that can restart an enclave without
requiring a new remote attestation. The enclave instead loads its
secrets from a configuration file encrypted with the enclave specific
seal key and kept in stable storage.
Currently, SGX supports only specially prepared Linux and Win-
dows libraries (.so and .dll files), but multiple works extend it to
legacy application and containers1 [11, 12, 53]. In its current version,
SGX is susceptible to cache-timing attacks [30], but an enhance-
ment has already been proposed to eradicate this vulnerability [52].
Moreover, SGX does not introduce significant overhead or increase
of execution time [61].
4 THREAT MODEL AND GOALS
The following actors participate in an Airtnt transaction:
• Requesters. End-user (possibly constrained IoT) devices
submit resource-heavy tasks to executing nodes. End-users
need to pay the executing node for the CPU cycles that the
latter has spent to complete the requested computation.
• Executing nodes. High CPU capacity nodes using their
resources to execute requested tasks/functions. Executing
nodes are paid for carrying out computations.
We assume that both parties mutually distrust one another. Each
party is potentially malicious, i.e., they may attempt to steal funds,
avoid making payments, and forge results, if it benefits them. At
any given time, each party may drop, send, record, modify, and
replay arbitrary messages in the protocol.
We assume that each executing node has a TEE-capable machine.
Both the requester and the executing node trust their own environ-
ments, the TEE, and the function running in the enclave (i.e., the
function has been checked before by the user or the community).
The enclave is thus trusted to correctly compute and attest the
result and not leak information to the hosting execution platform.
The rest of the system, such as the network between the parties and
the other party’s software stacks (outside the TEE) and hardware
are untrusted. During function execution, the executing node may
therefore: (i) access or modify any data in its memory or stored on
disk; (ii) view or modify its application code; and (iii) control any
aspect of its OS and other privileged software.
Airtnt makes use of smart contracts on a blockchain to facilitate
payments without a trusted third party. We assume that the under-
lying blockchain where the smart contract runs on is resistant to
1Note that only the part of the application that is processing sensitive data needs to
run in the enclave—not the whole application.
double-spending attacks, and has liveness - that is, transactions
submitted to the blockchain will be eventually processed, within
some defined period of time.
Given this threat model Airtnt achieves the following goals:
• Fair exchange.A requester will only receive the result of an
execution if the executing node gets paid for the execution,
and vice versa: an executing node will only get paid for the
execution, if the requester receives the result.
• Executingnode counterparty risk resistance. In the event
of a requester going offline or diverging from the protocol, a
requester cannot cause an executing node to perform a large
amount of work without payment.
• Execution transferability. In the event of an executing
node going offline or diverging from the protocol, a requester
should be able to resume a computation on a different exe-
cuting node, without losing all of the work that the original
executing node has already done on the computation.
• Execution integrity. The result of computations returned
to requesters must be correct and verifiable that the execut-
ing node executed the correct program.
5 SYSTEM DESIGN
We describe the Airtnt execution model within a TEE, and how
this model can be used for the fair exchange of i) payments and ii)
computation results.
5.1 Preliminaries and Notation
We present the notion used in the rest of the paper, as well as the
primitives on which Airtnt relies.
Cryptographic Primitives. Airtnt assumes a cryptographically se-
cure hash functionh(x). It also assumes a symmetric-key encryption
algorithm and a random key generation function дenerateKey().
We denote a messagem encrypted with the symmetric key k as
{m}k .
Smart Contract Primitives. For parts of the scheme that rely on
the public-key cryptography native to smart contracts, we denote
a messagem encrypted with a private key sk as [m]sk . We assume
a smart contract environment with support for the following prim-
itives:
• checkSig(m,σ ,addr ): returns true if the signature σ is a
valid cryptographic signature of the messagem by address
addr .
• send(v,addr ): sends v coins to the address addr .
• destroy(): terminates the contract, so that no party can call
any of the contract’s functions.
5.2 Execution Model
We present the Airtnt execution model.
Airtnt Functions. Requesters within Airtnt can request executing
nodes to execute Airtnt functions, which are programs loaded in a
secure enclave and remotely attested by the TEE. These programs
are predefined; the mechanism by which a requester can distribute
a program to executing nodes is irrespective of the Airtnt protocol
and out of the scope of this work.
Airtnt: Fair Exchange Payment for Outsourced Secure Enclave Computations Conference’17, July 2017, Washington, DC, USA
A requester requests for an executing node to compute the result
of an Airtnt function p. These functions take as input a state s, and
the number of execution cycles c to perform. They output the new
state s′, a set of messages representing the output of the program
®o, and the number of execution cycles actually performed d. If the
execution terminates before c cycles are performed, then d < c.
p(s, c) → s′, ®o, d (1)
In this model, state s0 of the function, provided in the beginning,
also contains the initial input parameters to the function. However,
the function may no longer need to work with the initial input
parameters in the middle of the execution, thus we do not explicitly
pass them to the function.
The demarcation of execution cycles is arbitrarily defined by the
implementation of a function p—as it is the function that is respon-
sible for calculating the number of cycles done d—and does not
necessarily correspond to execution cycles on the underlying CPU2.
In that sense, each execution cycle acts as a checkpoint. Execution
cycles in Airtnt play a similar role to gas costs in Ethereum–they
are a way to determine the cost of an execution. However an exe-
cution cycle on a non-terminal state always results in a new state,
so unless s is a terminal state, s , s′ if c > 0 in Equation (1).
If execution of p is split up into multiple steps, it should give the
same result and use the same number of execution cycles, such that
given p(s0,a) → s1, ®o1, d1 and p(s1,b) → s2, ®o2, d2, then p(s0,a +
b) → s2, ®o1 ∪ ®o2, d1 + d2.
If after execution of p, s′ is not a terminal state resulting from p
on s, then the requester may feed s′ into p again to continue the
execution. Note that Airtnt’s novel design allows for the computa-
tion to be continued on a different executing node (e.g., in case the
original one goes offline).
Wrapper Function. We also define a wrapper functionw forp that
is executed by the TEE upon receiving a request from a requester.
The wrapper function forms the basis of Airtnt’s fair exchange
protocol. The function takes in as input an Airtnt function p, input
state s, and number of execution cycles to perform, c. The function
outputs the new state s′ encrypted with an ephemeral symmetric
key k ({s′}k ), the output buffer encrypted with k ({®o}k ), the number
of cycles performed d, and the cryptographic hash of k (khashed ).
The value of these outputs are all attested by the TEE.
w(p, s, c) → {s′}k , {®o}k , d, khashed (2)
The wrapper functionw is the same for any function p, thus a
developer writing an application for Airtnt is only concerned with
defining p as their program.
Algorithm 1 Do procedurew(p, s, c)
s′, ®o, d ← p(s, c)
k ← дenerateKey()
khashed = h(k)
return {s′}k , {®o}k , d, khashed
2It is not always practical to count the number of instructions executed in a program
during runtime, and CPU may not be the only resource requirements of a program—
some programs may for example be more bandwidth- or memory-intensive.
State Diffs. In many applications, the difference between a given
state s and a later state s′ may be small, i.e., only a part of the
state may change. It would therefore be wasteful, e.g., in terms of
bandwidth cost, for the executing node to have to resend parts of
an intermediate state that the requester already has knowledge (an
identical copy) of. Instead of the executing node sending the whole
state to the requester, in Airtnt, the executing node sends a diff of
the new state to the previous one containing only the changes. We
assume a function genDiff that can be used by executing nodes to
generate such diffs from two states, and a function applyDiff that
can be used by requesters to decode the new state from a diff. The
execution model is independent of the actual implementation of
these functions.
genDiff(s, s′) → sd (3)
applyDiff(s, sd) → s′ (4)
The wrapper function can then be augmented to return the diff
of the new state rather than the entire new state.
Algorithm 2 Do procedurew(p, s, c)
s′, ®o, d ← p(s, c)
k ← дenerateKey()
khashed = h(k)
return {дenDi f f (s, s′)}k , {®o}k , d, khashed
5.3 Payments Protocol
We describe Airtnt’s payments protocol based on the execution
model described above. The protocol builds on a smart contract-
based unidirectional payment channel between the requester and
the executing node.
Firstly, we define a smart contract for creating and managing an
Airtnt-specific unidirectional payment channel that enables the re-
quester to send micropayments to the executing node after each in-
termediate state transition. The contract is held at idcontract and is
initiated by the function initChannel(addrr ,addre , timeout ,deposit)
containing the following variables:
• addrr : the address of the of requester (corresponding to a
public key);
• addre : the address of the executing node (corresponding to
a public key);
• timeout : the date that the channel will expire;
• deposit : the number of coins that the requester has deposited
into the contract.
Additionally, corresponding to addresses addrr and addre are
private keys skr and ske .
After the contract is initialised, the balance (i.e., number of coins
owed to the executing node) of the channel can be updated by the
requester. To do so, the requester is sending: i) a signature to the
executing node for the hash of the message idcontract | |v | |khashed ,
ii) the concatenation of the ID of the contract idcontract , iii) the
total amount of coins owed to the requester v , and iv) the hash
of the secret key khashed provided by the executing node after
the last execution round (see Section 5.2). Note that this procedure
takes place off the smart contract platform, as the requester sends
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the signature directly to the executing node. We denote the new
channel state signed by a private key skx as follows:
[h(idcontract | |v | |khashed )]skx (5)
The executing node can call the smart contractmethod closeChannel
by presenting a valid signature for the new state of the channel
from the requester, as well as its own signature for the state of
the channel (and the new balance of the channel). Crucially, the
executing node must provide to the smart contract the pre-image k
of khashed in order to close the channel and receive the funds, so
that the requester can decrypt the computation result, as will be
discussed in Section 5.4.
Algorithm 3 Do procedure closeChannel(siдr , siдe ,v, khashed ,k)
statehash ← h(idcontract | |v | |h(k))
assert checkSiд(statehash, siдr ,addrr )
assert checkSiд(statehash, siдe ,addre )
assert khashed = h(k)
assert v <= deposit
send(v,addre )
send(deposit −v,addrr )
destroy()
The payment channel also employs a timeout, such that if the
timeout is reached and the channel has not been closed, the channel
can be destroyed and deposits are returned back to the senders. This
is to prevent the case where the recipient of the channel (executing
node in our case) is malicious and extorts the sender of the channel
(requester in our case) to transfer extra money (without doing any
work) or otherwise, risking losing their deposit. The malicious
receiver/executing node can achieve that by just refusing to close
the channel. If this happens, the requesting node can simply wait
until the timeout to recover the deposited funds.
We thus define a smart contract procedure channelTimeout that
can be called after the timeout is reached.
Algorithm 4 Do procedure channelTimeout()
if timeout > now then
send(deposit ,addrr )
destroy()
end if
5.4 Airtnt protocol
We describe the overall Airtnt protocol unifying the execution
model described in Section 5.2 and the payments protocol described
in Section 5.3. Figure 2 provides an an overview of the protocol.
Setup phase. This phase is performed once at the beginning
of every relationship between a requester and an executing
node for a specific Airtnt function.
1 A requester R sends p, s, c (the function to be executed,
the initial state, and the number of cycles to perform) to
an executing node E. R also specifies some payment rate
per cycle, rate , that defines the number of coins that R is
willing to pay E for each computational cycle performed.
2 E responds to R by either accepting or rejecting the re-
quest.
3 If E agrees to fulfill the request, then R initializes a pay-
ment channel at idcontract , with the parameters initChannel(
addrR ,addrE , timeout ,deposit)whereaddrR is the address
of the requester,addrE is the address of the executing node,
timeout is some conservative timeout that is longer than
the time expected to fulfil the request, and deposit is a
value greater or equal to rate ∗c. If the payment channel is
not initialised with the appropriate parameters, E does not
participate, and R can proceed to the termination phase.
Both parties also locally maintain a variable b which rep-
resents the balance of the channel so far, and is iniitalised
with b = 0.
Execution phase. This is the phase where the main execution
loop takes place.
1 E executesw(p, s, c) in the TEE, returning {s′}k , {®o}k , d,
khashed , which are all attested by the TEE, and sends R
these outputs.
2 R checks that these outputs are attested by the TEE. If they
are, then R signs a new update to the payment channel,
[h(idcontract | |b + d ∗ rate | |khashed )]skR , and sends it to
E. R then locally updates b to b + d ∗ rate .
3 Upon E verifying that the signature received from R is
valid for the message h(idcontract | |b + d ∗ rate | |khashed ),
E sends R the secret key k. Note that E does not need to
receive the message itself, as it already has the information
to compute it. E then locally updates b to b + d ∗ rate . R
then decrypts {s′}k and {®o}k to get s′ and ®o.
4 R can now either request E to continue the execution of p
on the new state s′, or terminate the protocol and find a
different executing node to continue the execution on s′,
if s′ is not the terminal state.
Termination phase. There are two ways to terminate the pro-
tocol.
l E can close the payment channel by calling closeChannel(
siдR , siдE ,v, khashed ,k), thus transferring the owed amount
v to E and terminating the contract.
l If E becomes unresponsive or goes offline, then R can
wait until the timeout, and call channelTimeout() to get
its deposit back.
5.5 Evaluation
We evaluate how the design of Airtnt meets the threat model and
design goals set out in Section 4.
Fair Exchange. Airtnt aims to facilitate the fair exchange of pay-
ments and execution results. We break up this goal into two security
properties, that we argue for: i) E will only get paid iff R receives
the result of the execution and ii) R will only receive the result of
an execution iff E can get paid for it. For the latter goal we say
"can" rather than "will", because it is E’s responsibility to close the
payment channel and collect the payment, and so if E does not
do this then they can voluntarily forfeit the payment, technically
speaking.
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Figure 2: Overview of interactions between a requester, an executing node and a smart contract in Airtnt.
Theorem 5.1. Assuming R follows the protocol, an executing node
E will only get paid for executingw(p, s, c) → {s′}k , {®o}k , d, khashed
if and only if the requester R receives s′, ®o.
Proof. (Informal.) The only send call in the smart contract that
sends any coins to addrE is in the closeChannel function. For b
coins to be sent to addrE via closeChannel , both the E and R must
produce a signature of a message (the state hash) that authorises the
transfer of b to addrE . However, assuming R follows the protocol,
then R will only produce such a signature if and only if it receives
k from E to successfully decrypt {®o}k , d with a correct attestation
from the TEE. Furthermore, under the threat model described in
Section 4, the TEE is trusted to correctly execute w and produce
the encryptions of {®o}k , d; only the TEE is capable of producing
such attestation. □
Theorem 5.2. Assuming E follows the protocol and can submit a
closeChannel transaction that is executed before the channel timeout,
R can only receive s′, ®o for an executionw(p, s, c) → {s′}k , {®o}k , d,
khashed if and only if E can get paid for the execution.
Proof. (Informal.) Assuming E follows the protocol, E will only
send k, which is necessary to derive s′, ®o from {s′}k , {®o}k , to R if
and only if E receives from R a signed update to the channel for the
new balance b that pays for the execution. This signed update to
the channel state enables E to send a closeChannel transaction to
the blockchain to get paid b coins, if it is called before the channel
timeout. Under the threat model described in Section 4, the un-
derlying blockchain network is assumed to be resistant to double
spend attacks and will process the underlying transaction before
the timeout (has liveness). □
Executing Node Counterparty Risk Resistance. We argue that R
can only cause E to execute a single execution round of c cycles,
without payment. Note that even if this happens, the fair exchange
property of the protocol is not violated: R must make a payment to
receive the result.
Theorem 5.3. Assuming E follows the protocol, R cannot require
E to perform more than one execution w(p, s, c) → {s′}k , {®o}k , d,
khashed without updating the payment channel balance.
Proof. (Informal.) If E executesw and sends to R {s′}k , {®o}k , d,
khashed , but does not receive a signed channel update in response,
E will not executew on behalf of any more requests from R until it
receives a valid payment channel update, which may be never if
the payment channel expires. □
Execution Transferability. This goal is met in step 4 of the exe-
cution phase of the Airtnt protocol, building on the execution mode
described in Section 5.2. Upon decrypting the new intermediate
state s′ of the execution, R can either request the same execution
node to continue the execution on s′, or find a different node to
request the execution of the function on s′.
Execution Integrity. The integrity of execution results rely on the
security properties of the underlying TEE and on the cryptography
underlying the remote attestation protocol. The TEE is trusted
to correctly execute programs and produce attestations for their
results. If, for example, the TEE has security vulnerabilities, the
integrity of the results may be violated. Additionally, in the case of
Intel SGX, Intel is a trusted third party, as they have the ability to use
their cryptographic keys to generate fraudulent remote attestations.
Recall that in step 2 of the execution phase of the Airtnt protocol,
Rmust check that the outputs sent by E are attested by the TEE, thus
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if the security properties of the TEE hold, then execution integrity
also holds.
6 IMPLEMENTATION AND PERFORMANCE
Recall in Section 5.2 that executing nodes can return diffs of the new
state, thus programs that manipulate state have different network
overheads than programs that only consume state. We prototyped
Airtnt for those two types of applications which have different
properties in terms of the way they handle state:
• State-based programs (i.e., simulations). In simulations
and other types of programs that rely heavily on the need to
remember and manipulate intermediate state, Airtnt execut-
ing nodes need to return the changes made to the state to
requesters.
• Pure programs. These programs do not need to modify
state, but only process it and return output based on the
state. After processing parts of the state, the program may
discard the state if it does not need to revisit it. Intermediate
states may be thus a subset of the input state, with only state
removed and not added. These diffs would be negligible in
size compared to state-based programs, as they only contain
instructions to remove state at specific locations, and do
not need to transfer new state data. In some cases, such as
frame-by-frame image processing, these programs can be
parallelized across multiple Airtnt executing nodes.
We implement and evaluate a Game of Life simulation [19] to
illustrate an example of a state-based program, and a simple Optical
Character Recognition (OCR) [26] to illustrate an example of a
pure program. We release both of these applications as open-source
projects on GitHub3. We instantiated the requester on Amazon
AWS [8] on a t2.xlarge instance, and the executor on a Dell XPS
laptop with Intel Core i7-8550U running Intel SGX [20] as TEE.
6.1 State-based programs
To illustrate state-based programs we implement and evaluate a
Game of Life simulation [19]. The Game of Life is a simple example
of simulation acting on an arbitrarily large grid of cells, where each
cell is either filled in or not. The game starts with some pattern of
filled in cells, and evolves to obtain the next state by applying simple
transition rules concurrently to each cell of the gird. We implement
this example to show how Airtnt can be used to outsource state-
based simulations.
Figure 3 shows how the latency perceived by the requester (the
time to receive the final state after first submitting the request)
varies with the number of cycles per round (in semi-log scale); this
graph captures the total execution time. We fix the total number of
simulation steps to 1000 cycles (c = 1000), and run the simulation
for various grid sizes; 10× 10, 25× 25 , and 50× 50 (∼ 2.5kB of data).
As expected, the latency is much higher when requesting a few
cycles per round—the requester has to transmit intermediate states
back and forth every few cycles, which increases latency. When
Airtnt operates by steps of 10 cycles (leftmost point of the graph),
the requester has to send and receive 100 intermediate states (the
total number of cycles divided by the number of cycles per round)
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Figure 3: Game of Life – variation of the client perceived la-
tency of receiving the final state with the number of cycles
per round for various grid sizes. The total number of cycles
is fixed to 1000.
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Figure 4: Game of Life – variation of the bandwidth costwith
the number of cycles per round for various grid sizes. The
total number of cycles is fixed to 1000.
before completing the full simulation of 1000 cycles. However, when
operating with number of cycles per round ∈ [500, 990], only two
intermediate states are exchanged, and the latency is about 10
times lower. Moreover, Figure 3 shows that the latency first drops
exponentially4 and then flattens out when increasing the number
of cycles per round; increasing it from 10 to 200 reduces the latency
by almost 10 times. This allows to achieve latencies of the order
of ∼ 100ms , which is suitable for real-world scenarios. Figure 4
shows the variation of bandwidth cost with the number of cycles
(in semi-log scale). As expected, the bandwidth cost decreases with
the number of cycles; the number of intermediate states that the
requester needs to send varies as the total number of rounds. The
bandwidth cost is higher when the number of cycles per round is
10 as the requester sends 100 intermediate states, and then flattens
out when the number of cycles per round ∈ [500, 990] as only 2
intermediate states are transmitted.
Figure 5 shows the enclave execution time per cycle (in semi-log
scale). The graph suggests that calling the SGX enclave multiple
times introduces overhead. Therefore, working with low values
4Recall that the graph in Figure 3 is in semi-log scale.
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Figure 5: Game of Life – variation of the enclave execution
time with the number of cycles per round for various grid
sizes. The total number of cycles is fixed to 1000.
for the number of cycles per round results in calling the enclave
multiple times, which is expensive. To illustrate this phenomena,
Figure 6 shows the variation of the enclave execution time with
the number of enclave calls. This graph shows that executing 1000
cycles with 2 calls (the number of cycles per round ∈ [500, 990])
is about 5 times faster than executing them with 100 enclave calls
(10 cycles per round). Figure 3 and Figure 5 also suggest that when
the number of cycles per round is greater than 200 the communica-
tion time and the enclave execution time are of the same order of
magnitude.
Our evaluation of Game of Life shows a clear trade-off between
efficiency and low-risk. Executing Airtnt a few cycles at the time
(with low values for the number of cycles per round) helps with
mitigating the risk of a requester dropping out without paying for
the execution, but at the same time the cost of both bandwidth
and execution time increase. However, our evaluations help to
find the right balance; as noted above, increasing the number of
cycles per round from 10 to 200 improves latency by about 10 times,
while increasing it over 300 only adds a small benefit. Therefore,
choosing 200 cycles per round seems to be a good choice for our
implementation of Game of Life.
6.2 Pure programs
We implement and evaluate a simple Optical Character Recognition
(OCR) algorithm [26] to illustrate the execution of pure programs.
Our simple algorithm is initialized in the enclave with a model of
each letter of the alphabet; it can then be fed with input images to
detect the list of embedded letters. We implemented this example
to show how Airtnt can be used to outsource execution of pure
programs.
Figure 7 shows how the latency perceived by the requester varies
with the number of cycles (in semi-log scale). We fix the total num-
ber of simulation steps to 1000 cycles in total as in Section 6.1, and
run the simulation for images of size ∼ 1kB. The latency decreases
as for the Game of Life simulation but is much higher on overall
because the execution of each cycle requires a transmission of a
new input image. Therefore, the requester sends about 1.7MB of
data to the executor for the processing of 1000 images (1000 cycles)
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Figure 6: Game of Life – variation of the enclave execution
time with the number of enclave calls, for a 50× 50 grid. The
total number of cycles is fixed to 1000, and the number of
enclave calls varies from 2 (for number of cycles per round
∈ [500, 990]) to 100 (for 10 cycles per round).
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Figure 7: OCR – variation of the client perceived latency on
the number of cycles per round for images of ∼ 1kB. The
total number of cycles is fixed to 1000.
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total number of cycles is fixed to 1000.
of 1kB each; and the bandwidth cost stays constant regardless the
number of cycles.
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Figure 9 and Figure 10 respectively show the enclave execution
time per cycles and per number of enclave calls (in semi-log scale).
OCR is a much more CPU-intensive application than Game of Life—
running the algorithm over 1000 images requires more than 10
seconds in the enclave. The enclave execution times decreases by
200 ms from 10 cycle per round to 100 cycles per round, and then
stays roughly the same. As in Section 6.1, these graphs emphasize
the overhead of making multiple calls to the SGX enclave. Moreover,
Figure 7 and Figure 9 also suggest that the requester latency is
dominated by the time to send the input images (and not by the
enclave execution time).
Our experiments illustrate the differences between using Airtnt
to outsource the execution of state-based programs (e.g., Game of
life) and pure programs (e.g., OCR). State-based programs can run
multiple cycles from the same input as they operate on intermediate
steps; this allows to save on bandwidth cost as it flattens out when
increasing the number of cycles per round. Pure programs require
a new input each cycle and cause the bandwidth cost to remain
constant; the only benefit of increasing the number of cycles per
round in this case is to reduce the number of enclave calls and thus
save on execution time. However, pure programs can be parallelized.
A requester can send a subset of inputs to many executors, and
therefore divide latency by the number of executors involved in
the computation.
6.3 Limitations of Intel SGX
In terms of performance, Intel SGX introduces memory limitations
and performance overhead. Intel SGX limits the enclave memory
to 128 MB; this limitation comes from the BIOS, and sets and upper
bound to the input size that the executors can process simultane-
ously. It is however technically possible to extend that limit by
editing the paging support [34]. The performance overhead results
from accessing the encrypted memory in an enclave and from the
additional effort associated with entering and exiting an enclave.
As shown in Section 6, minimizing the number of accesses to the
enclave significantly increases performance.
On the security side, relying on Intel SGX requires trust into
Intel, as debated by many works recently [21, 36, 37, 49].
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The total number of cycles is fixed to 1000, and the num-
ber of enclave calls varies from 2 (for number of cycles per
round ∈ [500, 990]) to 100 (for 10 cycles per round).
6.4 Payment Channel Smart Contract
We implemented an Ethereum smart contract, written in Solidity,
for Airtnt unidirectional payment channels.
Due to the Ethereum Virtual Machine having a maximum stack
depth of 15, closeChannel had to be implemented in such a way that
it must be called twice: once for the requester’s signature, and once
for the executing node’s signature. This is because the maximum
stack depth limits the number of inputs a function may have. As
the maximum size of a variable in the Ethereum Virtual Machine
is 32 bytes, the amount of data that a function can take as input is
too limited to accept two ECDSA signatures.
We present the gas costs incurred by different functions of the
smart contract in Table 1. We note that the price of gas, and the
market price of Ether itself, varies wildly from time to time due to
volatility, so the USD cost is only accurate as of April 2018. The
largest cost is creating the contract at $0.46, as this involves up-
loading and storing the contract’s code in the Ethereum blockchain.
However, if the smart contract is uploaded as a library contract,
this cost can be significantly reduced as the payment channel code
only needs to be uploaded once.
The cost for initialising and closing a channel is $0.10 and $0.15
respectively, thus a complete Airtnt transaction between a requester
and executing node would cost $0.25. This cost could be reduced in
the future by using multi-hop payment channels (see the Lightning
network as an example [47]), so that a requesters do not need to
open a payment channel with every executing node, as long as there
is a path in the network between the requester and the executing
node.
7 RELATEDWORK
Result verification has been an active area of research in the past
with multiple proposed techniques. The first group of techniques
focuses on constructing cryptographic proof of computation [28, 44,
57, 58]. Such proofs are easy to verify without the need to re-execute
the computations. However, the overhead of pre-computation and
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Method Gas cost USD cost
(contract creation) 358,600 $0.46
initChannel 81,053 $0.10
closeChannel 114,757 $0.15
channelTimeout 21,732 $0.03
Table 1: A table showing the gas costs of executing themeth-
ods of the payment channel smart contract. The USD costs,
which is pegged to the price of Ethereum, are accurate as of
April 26, 2018 and assume a gas price of 2 Gwei (2·10−9 Ether).
For closeChannel , the figures are for calling closeChannel twice,
for each respective signature.
creation of the proof is orders of magnitude higher than the ac-
tual cost of the computation being verified. The second group of
techniques consists of running the same computations on multiple
servers [16, 22, 55, 56]. As long as a given fraction of servers is
honest, the result can be guaranteed by a consensus protocol. These
techniques require at least one honest server and increase signifi-
cantly the overhead as they rely on repeating the computation.
An approach closer to our work involving blockchain technology
is [23]. The authors assume only two execution entities and design
smart contracts discouraging them from colluding. Similarly, in
[46], authors determine an optimal penalty fee that should be paid
by execution platforms caught cheating. Huang et al.[33] also dis-
tribute the task to multiple workers and exploit Commitment-based
sampling [25] to verify the correctness of the result. Before starting
the computations, the workers have to commit to the task by spend-
ing bitcoins that are lost in case of dishonest behaviour. However,
both systems ([23, 33]) still require to repeat computations and
assume a trusted 3rd party to resolve conflicts.
Multiple projects focus on incentivising fairness and timely deliv-
ery of the results using cryptocurrencies [9, 13, 18, 38, 39]. Workers
deposit predefined amount of money that is lost if they misbehave.
However, all of them focus on fairness exclusively and ignore verifi-
ability of produced results. Finally, several projects aim to facilitate
blockchain-based micro-payments [40, 41, 47]. Those projects are
complementary to ours, and could be used to lower the cost and
overhead of transactions.
Several systems provide computations verification, but are lim-
ited to a specific class of tasks [51]. [17] supports only tasks that can
be easily verified by requesters and has lower security (execution
platforms are being fairly paid for their job with a probability < 1)
and do not provide privacy of the results. Hu et al.[32] focus on both
task verification and data privacy, but the system does not include
payments and works only for computation of the characteristic
polynomial of matrix.
Several industrial platforms were launched recently aiming to
realise a vision of a global decentralised computer. Golem [48],
focuses mainly on video rendering tasks. Execution platforms are
automatically paid if the requester confirms completion of the tasks.
However, in case of a conflict, the system relies on a consent that
must be trusted by both parties. SONM [6] develops a cloud-like
services platform based on fog computing as a backend. Execu-
tion platforms install SONM OS allowing to share and rent their
resources (i.e., CPU, GPU, Storage). So far, SONM do not provide
any details about their result verification techniques. iExec [4], yet
another platform for result verification and automatic payment
announced to use Intel SGX in their system, but does not provide
any additional details. Finally, Bounty0x [10] is an open platform
allowing people to post tasks with an associated prize. Anyone can
then submit a solution and collect the rewards. However, Bounty0x
does not provide an automatic verification process and relies on
manual conflict resolution.
8 CONCLUSION
We have proposed Airtnt, a protocol that i) enables requesters to
execute tasks on nodes with TEE-enabled CPUs, and ii) allows the
executing node to receive payments without either party having to
trust each other and without the need for a third party to resolve
disputes. We employ smart contracts to act as a trustless mediator
for the fair exchange of payment and execution result. We also use
checkpoint-based micropayments (through payment channels) to
reduce the impact of a requester going offline or becoming dishonest
after a long execution and wasting the requesting node’s resources
without payment.
Our evaluation of Game of Life and OCR show a clear trade-off
between efficiency and low-risk. Executing Airtnt a few cycles at
a time helps with mitigating the risk of requestors dropping out
without paying for the execution, but this comes at the cost of both
bandwidth and enclave execution time.
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